little-known experiment conducted by William McAdoo in1913. Friedman and Schwartz's suggestion that the1930 banking crisis might have been nipped in the bud with an operational Aldrich-Vreeland Act gains credibility from a key characteristic of crisis control under the Act: liquidity flowed automatically to where it was needed most. I recommend that the Federal Reserve adopt the principles of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act in its administration of the discount window. This will help preserve the integrity of the banking system, especially under wartime conditions with impaired communications.
I. What happened in 1914?
Foreigners owned more than $4 billion U.S. railroad stocks and bonds at the outbreak of the Great War, with $3 billion of that in British hands. These securities were liquid assets and could be sold quickly on the NYSE. Under the gold standard, foreign investors could then use their cash proceeds to acquire the precious metal from the American banking system. Fear that the United States would abandon the gold standard pushed the value of the dollar to unprecedented depths on world markets.
The magnitude of the problem forced America to defend itself: At the outbreak of the war, reserves at New York banks would have been cut in half if the British sold only five percent of their holdings (see Noyes, 1916, p.94) . People knew that the banks had tried to conserve reserves in 1907 by suspending the convertibility of deposits into currency. In 1914, the bankers worried that the gold outflow to Europe would "inspire fear" and trigger an added rush into cash before suspensions took effect. Without an operational Federal Reserve System, the currency shortage would spawn bank runs like "those experienced in the fall of 1907" --only worse. McAdoo's policies prevented a panic. Banks never suspended their promise to convert deposits into currency and the U.S. Treasury never left the gold standard during the summer and fall of 1914. On November 11, 1914, less than four months after the onset of the crisis, and four days before the opening of the Federal Reserve Banks, the exchange rate of the dollar relative to the pound sterling fell below the gold export point, and gold exports ceased. The threat to the American financial system disappeared. 2 Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p.196) 
III. Liquidity in Wartime
An important characteristic of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act was that once the Treasury Secretary declared a financial crisis under the Act, a bank could decide the timing and magnitude of securities to deposit as collateral for additional currency. Thus high-powered money expanded endogenously to meet a shortage of liquidity. According to Sprague (1915, p. 517) this feature of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act accounted for its success: "For the first time since the establishment of the national banking system the banks exercising the powers conferred upon them by the Aldrich Vreeland Act of 1908 were able to issue bank notes freely in coping with a crisis."
Direct aid to individual banks needing liquidity may be the best way to combat a panic under wartime conditions. Interruptions in communications facilities, caused by total war or by terrorist attacks, can precipitate liquidity shortages at specific financial institutions. 
McAndrews and

IV. 1930
The two key characteristics of currency creation under the Aldrich-Vreeland Act -- (1) direct aid to an individual bank, and (2) at the discretion of the bank --support Friedman and Schwartz's (1963, p. 172) Chandler, 1971, pp. 225-239) .
Open market operations suffered from discretionary delays plus the potential for towards incorporating the1908 emergency currency legislation in its operating procedures.
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